【讲座时间】2023年5月30日  14:00

【讲座地点】BV韦德108室

【讲座主题】Public Disclosure Regulatory Enforcement and Connected Investors in Corporate Bond Issuance

【嘉宾介绍】黄德尊，南加州大学教授

Guochang Zhang is the Chung Hon-Dak Professor in Accounting at the University of Hong Kong. He previously held academic positions at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and The University of Waterloo, Canada. He received a Bachelor degree (Engineering) from Shanghai Jiaotong University, and an MSc (Accounting) and a PhD (Finance) from the University of British Columbia. He has published papers in top academic journals including Accounting Review, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting Research, Review of Accounting Studies, and Management Science. His monograph “Accounting Information and Equity Valuation: Theory, Evidence, and Applications” has been used as teaching materials for doctoral and master programs and executive training. He previously served as an Associate Editor of European Accounting Review, a member of the Financial Reporting Standards Committee of the Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and an independent non-executive director of a listed company.

【内容提要】

We analyze whether regulatory comment letters (CLs) negatively affect corporate bond issuance and connected investors’ participation in the issuance could mitigate the CLs’ negative impact. Using a hand-collected dataset of CLs issued by China’s bond market regulator prior to the bond ssuance, we find that issuers are less likely to issue bonds after receiving CLs, suggesting that regulators’ concerns about issuers’ public disclosures negatively affect the issuance. However, we find that connected investors receive a larger allotment for the bonds from CL-recipients than non-CL-recipients, suggesting that connected investors increase their participation to mitigate CLs’ negative effect on the bond issuance. Moreover, the connected investors are financial institutions that have a prior lending relationship with the issuers. Their increase in bond purchase from the CL-recipient is subsequently rewarded by the issuer with more banking business, indicating that they have a quid pro quo relationship. We also find hat connected investors’ increase in bond purchase from the CL-recipient does not lead to better ex-post bond performance, refuting the notion that connected investors’ purchase is motivated by superior private information.